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INTRODUCTION
While scholars and governments alike view the liberalization of international
trade as a positive development, they disagree on the medium that will accom-
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plish this objective with the highest economic returns. Some experts believe that
multilateralism through the 150+ member World Trade Organization (WTO) is
the only way to achieve truly open and efficient trade. Others view multilateral-
ism as but an aspiration and find that regionalism offers the only viable prospect
for the meaningful further opening of markets.
In light of what we label the "new regionalism," our paper explores in detail
the positive and negative effects of regional trade arrangements (RTAs). In so
doing, we necessarily pass judgment on the counterfactual of using global
trading rules to increase disciplines on government restrictions on the further
liberalization of trade. In Part I, we describe the "new regionalism" and explain
how it affects assessment of the benefits and disadvantages of RTAs. In Part II,
we trace the historical and legal background of RTAs beginning with the 1947
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
The closely-related Parts III and IV examine in detail the positive and
negative benefits of regional economic arrangements, primarily from an eco-
nomic perspective. Our conclusions seek to answer the question of whether the
WTO and other global institutions continue to serve a useful function from an
economic standpoint. We offer to policy officials dealing with regional trade
treaties specific prescriptions for addressing the changing roles of global and
regional instruments.
I. THE NEW REGIONALISM
Complicating our comparison of regional and global alliances is the emer-
gence of "new regionalism."' New regionalism differs from prior efforts at
regional integration in a variety of respects, and most definitions share certain
commonalities. Old regionalism was a Cold War phenomenon with specific
objectives such as trade or security, whereas new regionalism is the result of a
multidimensional, comprehensive societal approach in a context of globaliza-
tion and a multi-polar world.2 In addition to economic integration and trade,
new regionalism includes political, social, economic, and cultural aspects, as
well as security and democracy, the environment, social policy, governmental
accountability, and legitimacy.
Unlike old regionalism, new regionalism is created within a region by the
constituent members instead of by superpowers and is characterized by the
participation of state and non-state actors.3 New regionalism is structured to
1. This discussion is drawn in part from Stephen Joseph Powell & Patricia Camino P6rez, Global
Laws, Local Lives: Impact of the New Regionalism on Human Rights Compliance, 17 BUFFALo HUM.
Rrs. L. REv. (forthcoming Spring 2011).
2. Bjorn Hettne & Andrds Inotai, The New Regionalism: Implications for Global Development and
International Security 1-2 (UN Univ., World Inst. for Dev. Econ. Research, Working Paper, 1994),
available at http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/previous/enGB/rfa-14.
3. Id. at 1-2.
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make economies more open, competitive, democratic, and market-based 4 in-
stead of inward-oriented. RTAs are used to help consolidate and prompt eco-
nomic and political reforms in prospective members. New regionalism is
characterized by high levels of economic interdependence and a multilateral
framework.' In addition, new regionalism anticipates deeper integration, as
well as linkage of developed and emerging market countries. 6 Deep inte-
gration involves expanding or establishing the institutional environment to
facilitate trade and the location of production regardless of national borders.
New regionalism involves the achievement of full economic union and may
include facilitating foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, liberalizing the
movement of labor, harmonizing domestic subsidy and tax policies, har-
monizing macro-economic policies, establishing institutions to facilitate and
manage integration, improving transportation and communications infrastruc-
ture, and monetary union through establishment of a common currency and
integrated exchange rate and monetary policy.8 Features of new regionalism
also include: knowledge and technology transfers and diffusion, dynamic com-
parative advantage, elimination of wasteful rent-seeking activities, pro-
competitive gains through increasing import competition, increased geographical
dispersion of products, increased FDI, and increased efficiency through greater
competition. 9
As noted, regionalism also is characterized by its creation of linkages be-
tween developing and developed countries. For example, the United States has
RTAs with emerging market countries: Israel, the North American Free Trade
Agreement,o Jordan, Morocco, Chile, the DR-CAFTA, and Peru; the EU has
thirty-five RTAs with emerging market countries."
Because the new regionalism and its deeper integration involve elements that
are not purely economic, it is difficult to evaluate RTAs formed under new
regionalism using the economic techniques created to evaluate old regionalism
RTAs. As discussed below, economic evaluation takes into account only trade
creation and trade diversion effects. In evaluating RTAs under new regionalism,
4. Robert Devlin & Antoni Estevadeordal, What's New in the New Regionalism of the Americas?
21 (Inter-American Dev. Bank, Working Paper No. 6, 2001), available at http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/
getdocument.aspx?docnum= 35309686.
5. Id.
6. Mary E. Burfisher et al., Regionalism: Old and New, Theory and Practice 4 (Int'l Food Pol'y
Research Inst., Markets, Trade and Inst. Div., Discussion Paper No. 65, 2004), available at http://
www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/mtidp65.pdf.
7. Sherman Robinson et al., Presentation to the GTAP Annual Conference: Deep Integration and
Trade Productivity Links: Tentative Lessons for CGE International Trade Models 7 (June 2006),
available at https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/download/2707.pdf.
8. See Burfisher et al., supra note 6, at 10-11.
9. Id. at 27-28.
10. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (chs. 1-
9); 32 I.L.M. 605 (chs. 10-22) [hereinafter NAFTA].
11. See Burfisher et al., supra note 6, at 11-12; see also DAVID A. GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE
AGREEMENTs: LAw, POLICY AND PRACTICE 207 (2009).
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new trade theories evaluate trade-productivity links, rent-seeking behavior, and
imperfect competition.12
HI. REGIONALISM UNDER THE GATT
Economic valuation of RTAs relies on two yardsticks: trade creation, the
benefit that members of an RTA receive after forming the RTA; and trade
diversion, the economic disadvantage that third parties and the RTA members
themselves bear as a result of forming the RTA.13 Trade creation means that
intra-regional trade has increased, while trade diversion refers to the loss of
trade from non-parties that result from lowering intra-regional trade barriers."
RTAs result in both trade creation and diversion. Therefore, the relevant ques-
tion in determining the economic utility of an RTA is whether it creates more
trade than it diverts.
Theories that measure the economic gains and losses from RTAs generally
focus on two types: first, static gains and losses, which are created by a
one-time reallocation of an existing stock of labor, capital, and other resources;
and second, dynamic gains and losses, which are created from the other effects
on potential output and productive capacity, including economies of scale, an
improved investment climate, increased competition, an increased pace of
technological change, and spill-over effects. Static gains and losses depend
upon the size of the gains that result from trade creation and losses from trade
suppression or diversion." Trade creation is a positive consequence, while trade
diversion is a negative consequence. Opponents of RTAs argue that they
undermine the objectives of multilateral trade through the protection of less
competitive industries.' 6 In this view, RTAs also are discriminatory, encourage
disintegration, and occur at the expense of third parties.
Proponents of RTAs contend that they increase trade and trade specialization,
are a stepping stone toward a fully integrated global economy, allow countries
to examine liberalization strategies on a smaller scale before applying them
universally, and are not harmful to the global welfare, even if they do not
provide as many benefits to world welfare as would multilateral disciplines.17
Ill. POSITIVE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF REGIONALISM
Even conceding that the need for multi-country cooperation to achieve the
highest economic returns is great, since the Uruguay Round was concluded in
12. See Burfisher et al., supra note 6, at 27.
13. Mohammad F. Nsour, Regional Trade Agreements in the Era of Globalization: A Legal Analysis,
33 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 359, 365 (2008).
14. Id.
15. Jason R. Wolff, Putting the Cart Before the Horse: Assessing Opportunities for Regional
Integration in Latin America and the Caribbean, 20 SPG FLETCHER F. WoRLD Arr. 103, 105 (1996).
16. See Nsour, supra note 13, at 365-66.
17. Id. at 366-67.
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1994, multilateral talks have sputtered, victim to A true lack of international
consensus on a number of critical issues, an escalation of the North-South
Divide, and an obsession with multilateralism to solve the world's problems.
Moises Naim, editor-in-chief of Foreign Policy Magazine, proposes a theory
that he calls "minilateralism," a process that anticipates utilizing the smallest
number of countries needed to have the largest possible effect on solving a
particular problem. We may think of the number of countries as minilateralism's
"magic number," which depends on the type and nature of the problem.18
Naim offers an example of how minilateralism could merge the best aspects
of both global and regional trade governance. The Group of Twenty includes
rich and poor countries from across six continents and accounts for 85% of the
world's economy.1 9 The countries in the G-20 could potentially reach a trade
deal among themselves, for example, on trade in environmental products that
counter global climate change, and allow other countries to join. By using
minilaterism's magic number, a process to advance trade liberalization could
break the multilateral gridlock and generate solutions that could provide a
foundation upon which negotiators may build agreements that are more inclu-
20sive.
A. RTAs Increase Efficiency
In a similar fashion, smaller and perhaps more realistic RTAs arguably can
provide a solution to gridlock in the global trade arena and can otherwise
complement the WTO trading system.2 1 Through Article XXIV of the GATT,
the original 23 Members professed the belief that RTAs can facilitate interna-
tional trade.22 WTO Members often resort to RTAs out of frustration with the
multilateral system and its lack of progress, or their lack of progress within the
23WTO system.
The fewer participants in RTAs allow members to engage in more flexible
negotiations. 24 RTAs also focus on the interests of a specific region or group of
regions, instead of on global interests. 2 5 Geographically close, regional neigh-
bors will inevitably trade; often they speak the same language, so communica-
18. Moises Naim, Minilateralism: The Magic Number to get Real International Action, FOREIGN
POLICY MAGAZINE, July/Aug. 2009.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Sungjoon Cho, Defragmenting World Trade, 27 Nw. J. Ir'L L. & Bus. 39, 41 (2006).
22. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XXIV:4, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-7, 55 U.N.T.S.
187, (as amended by Special Protocol relating to article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, signed at Havana on Mar. 24, 1948, GATT/1/162/), available at http://www.wto.org/gattdocs/
English/SULPDF/90310346.pdf.
23. PETER SUTHERLAND, ET AL., THE FuURE OF THE WTO: ADDRESSING INSTrrUTIONAL CHALLENGES IN
THE NEW MILLENNIUM 19 (2005) (report by the Consultative Bd. to the WTO Director-General),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/l0annive/future-wto-e.pdf [hereinafter CB Report].
24. See Cho, supra note 21, at 41.
25. Rafael Leal-Arcas, The European Union and New Leading Powers, 32 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 345,
381 (2009).
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tion is facilitated; they share the same legal history, which avoids the clash of
laws; and they engage in the same or similar occupations, with the result that
understanding of trade needs is enhanced.26
The WTO has a consensus decision-making process in the negotiating rounds
and a membership of over 150 countries.2 7 Because of the collective decision-
making process of the VTO, negotiation processes can be cumbersome, espe-
cially in new areas such as services and information technology products. In
addition, each member and various coalitions have their individual agendas,
making it difficult, if not impossible, to reach a consensus.2 8 Negotiations
among a smaller group of countries can produce better outcomes in a shorter
amount of time. Once these agreements are adopted and implemented, countries
can learn valuable lessons, which they can then use in negotiating subsequent
multilateral agreements.2 9
B. RTAs Provide Solutions to Development Problems
Trade can create economic ties and increase prosperity, thereby contributing
to peace and security.30 Arguably, a more open and equitable trading system can
bring peace 31 and prosperity to the world. Regionalism can provide solutions to
development problems.3 2 There appears to be a consensus that expanded trade
plays a key role in a successful development strategy. Emerging market coun-
tries often form RTAs with developed countries to compete with non-member
states for the developed country's FDI, which includes the prospect of increased
productivity and the transfer of technology. The potential for attracting FDI may
be great enough to induce countries to introduce reforms. It may also encourage
non-members to introduce reforms33 in order to compete to receive FDI.
Because RTAs can encourage both members and non-members to initiate
reforms, RTAs have a positive influence on infrastructural and other develop-
ment.
Regional cooperation for development reduces levels of discord and facili-
tates development cooperation, thereby turning trade relations into an effective
form of conflict prevention. 3 4 By increasing contact among producers, consum-
- 26. STEPHEN JOSEPH POWELL & BERTA ESPERANZA HERNAmEZ-TRUYOL, JUST TRADE: A NEW COVENANT
LINKING TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTs 41(2009).
27. C. O'Neal Taylor, Regionalism: The Second-Best Option?, 28 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 155, 169
(2008).
28. Sungjoon Cho, Breaking the Barrier Between Regionalism and Multilateralism: A New Perspec-
tive on Trade Regionalism, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 419, 432-33 (2001).
29. Phillip E. Koehnke, North American Free Trade: Mexico, Canada and the United States,
12 CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. 67, 68 (1992).
30. See Leal-Arcas, supra note 25, at 346.
31. Id.
32. Chun Hung Lin, Regionalism or Globalism? The Process of Telecommunication Cooperation
Within the OAS and NAFTA, 11 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 30, 33 (2002).
33. Id.
34. Id.
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ers, and traders across neighboring borders, trade stimulates more harmonious
relations35 by giving these parties an economic incentive to work together and
maintain relationships. This can be especially important where the parties have
a history of conflict. It gives them a mutual goal toward which each may work.
RTAs provide poorer countries with mutual development gains through ex-
panded markets, pooled resources, greater economic diversification, and in-
creased regional investment and trade.3 6
RTAs can also reduce trade in small arms and conflict resources such as
illegal timber and blood diamonds.3 7 For example, in 1998 the Economic Com-
munity of West African States (ECOWAS) established the world's first morato-
rium on light weapons and placed a ban on the import of new weapons without
the approval of ECOWAS members.3 8
In addition, trade creates economic interdependence, making political dis-
putes and military conflict more costly. Countries have to determine whether
engaging in a conflict with a trading partner creates enough gains to justify the
action. By engaging in a dispute with another country, both countries potentially
lose the benefits gained through their trading relations, and are arguably worse
off. This could deter many conflicts from occurring. RTAs provide an institution
and forum for negotiating and bargaining, thereby addressing tensions before
they become full blown conflicts.39 Conflicts also have potential consequences
for a country's RTAs with other countries or regions. Conflict or disputes may
disrupt a country's ability to fulfill its obligations under an RTA, or its dispute
with one country may alienate its trading partners, thus, multiplying the costs of
conflict. New York Times columnist and author Thomas Friedman calls this
concept the "Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention": "[N]o two coun-
tries that both had McDonalds had fought a war against each other since each
got its McDonalds."4 0
Every rule has its exception; in this case, the Russia-Georgia and Israel-
Lebanon conflicts, but Friedman's seemingly facetious notion continues to have
purchase. Trading partners bring huge financial losses to their global industries
when they go to war, and this fact will not be lost in the strategic discussions of
conflict resolution.4 1
35. Id.
36. OLi BROWN ET AL., REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTs: PROMOTING CONFLICT OR BUILDING PEACE? 9,
available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/securityrta_conflict.pdf.
37. Id.
38. Press Release No. 65/2000, ECOWAS, ECOWAS Adopts Curriculum to Control The Flow of
Small Arms (Oct. 2, 2000), available at http://news.ecowas.int (select "2000" then select link under
"2 October 2000").
39. Id.
40. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 239 (2000).
41. See also Richard N. Haass, The Geopolitics of Golf, NEWsWEEK, Sept. 14, 2009, at 19.
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RTAs can also influence growth through technology transfers. 4 2 Trade in-
creases productivity by providing access to a greater and more advanced range
of technologies.4 3 By importing goods, which are either new or of a higher
quality than existing products, a country can increase its productivity and can
benefit from the research and development activities of the exporting country"
without having to actually invest in the research and development. Therefore,
signing RTAs with technological leaders can increase the productivity of a
country by providing them access to technologies they- would not otherwise
possess.
C. RTAs Create a Level Playing Field
Globalization has created an economic interdependence among countries.
Emerging market countries can no longer pursue economic growth and develop-
ment by remaining aloof from the global trading system. Emerging market
countries wish to develop trade relationships that are more easily achievable on
a global scale.4 5 Accession to the WTO takes years and is not an immediate
solution to the problem of increasing an emerging market country's participa-
tion in trade.46 RTAs involve a smaller number of participants and interests,
thereby reducing the costs of negotiation and making it easier to reach an
agreement.4 7
Regionalism can also "level the playing field" for emerging market coun-
tries.4 8 Countries more fully integrated into the global economy often show
higher rates of economic growth; however, many emerging market countries
have experienced low economic growth.49 In addition, countries with better
access to world markets have a higher per capita income as compared with
countries with less access. RTAs provide emerging market countries an opportu-
nity to access world markets and integrate into the global economy on at least a
regional scale. This allows them to increase their rates of economic growth and
per capita income.
In addition, a country's communication and transport infrastructures and the
quality of its institutions have a strong impact on the likelihood that the country
will participate meaningfully in the global market. For example, African firms
export less than their counterparts in other regions because of governmental
42. WORLD BANK, REPoRT No. 34437, GLOBAL EcONOMIC PROSPECrs 2005: TRADE, REGIONALISM, AND
DEVELOPMENT 64 (2005), http://www-wds.worldbank.org (search: "global economic prospects" and
"regionalism") [hereinafter GEP].
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See CB Report, supra note 23, at 19.
46. Susan L. Sakmar, Globalization and Trade Initiatives in the Arab World: Historical Context,
Progress to Date, and Prospects for the Future, 42 U.S.F. L. REv. 919, 929 (2008).
47. Chris Brummer, The Ties That Bind? Regionalism, Commercial Treaties, and the Future of
Global Economic Integration, 60 VAND. L. REv. 1349, 1361 (2007).
48. See Lin, supra note 32, at 33.
49. See id.
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infrastructure needs and adverse geographical conditions."o
Moreover, the use of non-reciprocal preferences has grown over the past
decade, especially among emerging market countries. Because firms in emerg-
ing market countries often need positive discrimination to compete in the global
arena, non-reciprocal preferences can positively affect the commercial value to
these firms.5 ' RTAs have the ability to focus on the specific needs of the
member countries. Small countries have an incentive to participate in RTAs
because such blocs enable them to exert increased market power as a group.5 2
In addition, it allows them market access.53 RTAs provide a certain measure of
insurance against future protectionist policies and an incentive against being left
out of future agreements. 5 4 RTAs provide a stepping stone for emerging market
countries to participate in the global arena on a wider basis. For example, the
Asian and Pacific countries formed the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation to
counter NAFTA's protectionist effects.56 The Southern Cone Common Market
(MERCOSUR) among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay is another
example of this response to other regional blocs.5 7
D. RTAs Increase Liberalization
RTAs provide flexibility in terms of their design and content. Countries
often have a number of non-economic considerations in approaching RTAs such
as national security and regional stability.59 RTAs in Latin America and the
Caribbean have occurred for various reasons including economic complementar-
ity, geographical proximity, and political affinity.6 0 They can address issues on a
regional level that multilateral agreements cannot, such as migration, energy,
transit, water, customs, labor, and standards. 61 The specific problems related to
each issue differ based upon the country and region. Therefore, it is not feasible
for multilateral agreements to encompass each of these issues in a way that is
favorable to all countries involved. It would make multilateral agreements far
too complicated and cumbersome. RTAs provide a framework for making
progress on these issues.62 In addition, many governments are more familiar
with the governments of neighboring countries and RTAs provide a forum for
50. Id.
51. See CB Report, supra note 23, at 20.
52. See Burfisher et al., supra note 6, at 14.
53. See GEP, supra note 42, at 36.
54. Id.
55. See CB Report, supra note 23, at 20.
56. See Nsour, supra note 13, at 365.
57. Id.
58. See Taylor, supra note 27, at 159.
59. Jiangyu Wang, China's Regional Trade Agreements: The Lw, Geopolitics, and Impact on the
Multilateral Trading System, 8 S.Y.B.I.L. 119 (2004).
60. See Wolff, supra note 15, at 124.
61. See CB Report, supra note 23, at 37.
62. Id.
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promoting liberalization in a manner that is consistent with their national
interests. 6 3 For example, MERCOSUR was established to decrease tensions
between Brazil and Argentina." "It also helped avert a coup in Paraguay
following reaffirmation by the presidents of the MERCOSUR member countries
that democracy was a condition for membership."6 5 While MERCOSUR was
established to become a customs union, it also provides member countries a
platform to discuss other issues such as security and drug trafficking.
Trade liberalization increases competition in domestic markets.6 ' For some
countries it is not politically feasible to open its internal market to trade from all
686countries. Therefore, RTAs provide a stepping stone toward liberalization.
RTAs condition states for liberalization, while making states more amenable to
true multilateral trade.70 RTAs may also encourage countries to liberalize by
presenting a non-member country with a "carrot" if it liberalizes. 7 ' Under the
"carrot" approach, RTAs can merge and expand to encompass more economies
as a bridge to global trade.72
RTAs can increase liberalization through new trade rules in the area of market
regulations and investment rules.7 By eliminating internal barriers and creating
larger internal markets, these new trade rules can raise the return on investments
and create an incentive for members and third countries to invest.74 Firms
investing in the RTA countries can achieve economies of scale by serving a
larger market of potential buyers, decrease their transaction costs, and if ser-
vices are included, can benefit from more efficient telecommunications, finan-
cial, and other services." New trade rules may also induce greater efficiency
in transactions with the global economy. Investments to reach the local market
may include utilizing lower cost production sites within the RTA to serve the
wealthier customers.76
For example, one study done in 2004 showed that firms in the businesses of
electronics, textiles, and autos moved their production to Mexico to serve the
U.S. market.77
63. See Brummer, supra note 47, at 1357.
64. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 36, at 9.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 6.
67. See GEP, supra note 42, at 67.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Brummer, supra note 47, at 1360-61.
71. John P. Byrley, Regional Arrangements, the GATT and the Quest for Free Trade, 6 FLA.
J. INr'L L. 323, 333 (1991).
72. Id. at 334.
73. See CB Report, supra note 23, at 23.
74. See GEP, supra note 42, at 105.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 106.
77. Id.
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Some scholars argue that removal by RTAs of trade barriers among partners
can create economies of scope at the individual firm level and economies of
scale at the industry level.7 Economies of scope and economies of scale allow
for the increased rationalization of production, leading to the efficient use of
resources and resulting in a greater volume of global trade.79 This benefits
members and non-members, and the benefits which spill over to outsiders may
outweigh the costs of the original trade diversion.so
Larger markets can increase competition between suppliers and take advan-
tage of differing regional factor prices in order to increase productivity and
cause more rapid growth.8' Increased competition forces firms to develop more
efficient methods of production and can decrease the cost of the product. Firms
have an incentive to create goods that are cheaper and more improved than
similar goods from similar firms, thereby benefitting the global welfare. This
rapid growth attracts intra-bloc and extra-bloc investments.82
RTAs may also include new investment rules designed to increase market
access, thereby creating an opportunity for investors and new investment.
These investor protections can include "nondiscrimination among all investors,
provisions against expropriation, dispute settlement with eligibility for investor-
state suits, and independent arbitration."8 This provides firms and investors
with confidence to invest in a country governed by an RTA and lowers their
risks because they know what legal protections they can expect to receive.
IV. NEGATIVE EcoNoMIC EFFECTS OF REGIONALISM
A. The "Spaghetti Bowl" Crisis
Many scholars contend that the proliferation of RTAs has disrupted the
equilibrium between multilateralism and regionalism established under the
GATT. They argue that this disruption in equilibrium has caused world trade to
become fragmented.85 As of July 2010, WTO Members had notified 474 RTAs
to GATT/WTO, 283 of which had entered into force.8 It would appear that
RTAs have become the norm and may not necessarily complement the global
regional trading system.8 They may undermine the purpose of the WTO, which
is to help trade flow as freely as possible by removing obstacles and providing
78. See Byrley, supra note 71, at 332.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 333.
81. See GEP, supra note 42, at 106.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 107.
85. See Cho, supra note 21, at 40.
86. Regional Trade Agreements, WoRLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/region-e/
region e.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2011).
87. See Cho, supra note 21, at 41-42.
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predictability and transparency. Scholar L. Alan Winters has likened RTAs to
street gangs and has said, "[Y]ou may not like them, but if they are in the
neighborhood, it is safer to be in one".8
In addition, RTAs can create a downward spiral. Some scholars argue that
regional trade partners have a tendency to negotiate as a bloc in multilateral
trade talks, as opposed to individual nations. 90 This forces other nations to
develop RTAs of their own or else they risk losing bargaining power.9' This
leads to the creation of further RTAs, rather than true trade liberalization.
Noted economist and trade liberalization advocate Jagdish Baghwati, of
Columbia University, argues that RTAs result in trade diversion and create what
he terms the "spaghetti bowl" crisis. 9 2 The spaghetti bowl is comprised of
customs unions, regional and bilateral free trade areas, common markets,
preferences, and miscellaneous trade deals.93 Every country negotiates different
trading terms in each RTA with a different country with their own exceptions,
loopholes, and regulations, turning global trade into a hodge-podge of dissimilar
agreements.94
The global trade system is now characterized by a crisscrossing of prefer-
ences, with different trade barriers applying to products depending on the
origin of the product.95 The spaghetti bowl has resulted in the Most-favored
Nation principle being superseded by what some scholars term the Least-
favored Nation principle.96 MFN is the "cornerstone" of the GATT/WTO
system and is a commitment of nondiscrimination whereby each WTO Member
treats every other Member country equally.9 7 RTAs facilitate intra-bloc trade,
but impede global trade by providing barriers to extra-bloc trade and causing
dissociation of the bloc from the rest of the world because of the preferential
nature of its RTA.9
RTAs, by their very nature, lower duties and taxes for their members;
however, they preserve or raise tariff barriers for the rest of the world.99 For
88. What Is the World Trade Organization, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_el
whatis e/tif e/factle.htm.
89. Stephen Walsh, Addressing the Abuse of the WTO's Exemption for Regional Trade Agree-
ments, ELSA.ORG, 73 (2004), http://www.elsa.org/fileadmin/user-upload/elsa-intemational/PDF/SPEL/
SPELO4_1_WALSH.pdf.
90. See Byrley, supra note 71, at 333.
91. Id.
92. Christopher M. Bruner, Hemispheric Integration and the Politics of Regionalism: The Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), 33 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 1, 63 (2002).
93. Id. at 63-64.
94. News Release, Council on Foreign Relations, CFR's Jagdish Bhagwati Argues Against Preferen-
tial Trade Agreements in New Book; Recommends Completion of Multilateral Doha Round (July 16,
2008), available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/16798/cfrs.
95. Jagdish Bhagwati, Reshaping the WTO, 168 FAR EAsTERN EcON. REv. 25, 28 (2005), available at
http://faculty.nps.edu/relooney/0New-44.pdf.
96. See Cho, supra note 21, at 42.
97. Koehnke, supra note 29, at 70.
98. See Cho, supra note 21, at 42.
99. Brummer, supra note 47, at 1391.
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example, the U.S. agreement with the Dominican Republic and five Central
American countries, the DR-CAFTA-US Agreement eliminates more than 80%
of tariffs on industrial goods traded between the member countries.'o In
addition, intra-trade liberalization may be limited because certain sectors may
be insulated from open trade and thus excluded from coverage under the RTA or
protected by rules of origin. 1o
B. RTAs Create Market Confusion
RTAs can create confusion in the global trading arena because multiple
preferential rates are being applied to various trading partners. 10 2 These differ-
ing rates often apply within schemes that have different timelines for reaching
the preferential rates. The different RTAs may also be inconsistent and complex,
making it difficult and costly to administer the schemes.10 3 For example, tariffs
on U.S.-Mexico trade were not fully eliminated until some fifteen years after
NAFTA's entry into force, while most tariffs were reduced to zero upon the
agreement's entry into force on January 1, 2003. Other tariffs were cut at five-,
ten-, or fifteen-year intervals.'0" Multiply the confusion engendered by this
panoply of tariff changes on hundreds, of traded products by the hundreds of
RTAs facing exporters and the conundrum facing traders in the global market
becomes clearer.
Some scholars contend that these differences in border rules increase transac-
tion costs involved with trading in the global arena.' 05 These costs can be
particularly burdensome for small corporations and firms, and therefore for
emerging market countries because they are added to the formal costs of
administering preferences and the potential for informal costs.10 6 These costs
must be considered when determining the usefulness of RTAs. Because these
costs may be too great to permit an adequate focus on the multilateral arena, 0 7
this can cause a diversion of resources from multilateral trading agreements.
Trade negotiators in emerging market countries are often incapable of concentrat-
ing on more than one trading negotiation at a time. 108
RTAs can make it more difficult to achieve multilateral liberalization because
they create "complex networks of trade regimes potentially undermining trans-
parency and predictability."IO9 Contrast this result with that of the absence of
discriminatory policies and taxes on imports, which maximizes competition
100. Christina Laun, The Central American Free Trade Agreement and the Decline of U.S. Manufac-
turing, I IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 431, 435 (2007).
101. See Cho, supra note 21, at 42.
102. See CB Report, supra note 23, at 22.
103. Id.
104. See NAFTA, supra note 10, at art. 302; see also id. at annex 302.2, § 3.
105. See CB Report, supra note 23, at 22.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 23.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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worldwide and makes it possible for consumers to enjoy optimal prices and the
efficient allocation of resources." 0
Some scholars argue that major powers, like the United States, benefit from
intra-bloc trade in a highly disproportionate manner and are able to use RTAs to
gain superior terms in negotiations with less powerful states."' In this view,
RTAs provide the United States a forum to "export domestic legal rules and
norms into the international arena." 1 2 Because the United States is a dominant
economic player, they have little difficulty in furthering their interests in the
agreement and thus, the agreements could be considered business contracts.' 13
These RTAs are negotiated from positions based on extreme power disequilib-
rium, thereby enforcing the disequilibrium between the dominant and less
dominant countries." 4 Because RTAs can exploit emerging market countries
through unequal provisions, RTAs can exacerbate the developmental differences
between the developed and emerging market countries. RTAs may also aggra-
vate the developmental disparity of countries because of the uneven distribution
of benefits from free trade.' 15
Members of large blocs can enhance their economic well-being through
internal integration and the resulting economies of scale; however, the exports
of non-member states may be threatened by the gains made by larger bloc
members." 6 In addition, even though RTA members may enjoy positive ben-
efits from the RTA, they do not benefit equally."' RTAs generally produce
winners and losers.' 18 For example, if two countries with different levels of
domestic infrastructure enter into an RTA, the country with the superior infrastruc-
ture will attract more industrial activities." 9 This causes an uneven spread of
economic activities, which will only increase.' 20
Another form of this is called "hub and spoke" regionalism, in which the
economically powerful "hub" country establishes bilateral trade agreements
with economically inferior "spoke" countries. 21 The hub benefits disproportion-
ately because it has access to agreements with multiple spokes and often enjoys
110. See Brummer, supra note 47, at 1355.
11l. See Cho, supra note 28, at 432-33.
112. Mark B. Baker, No Country Left Behind: The Exporting of U.S. Legal Norms Under the Guise
of Economic Integration, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 1321, 1324 (2005).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1330.
115. See Cho, supra note 21, at 70.
116. Id.
117. See Brummer, supra note 47, at 1390.
118. See Souleymane Coulibaly, On the Complementarity of Regional and Global Trade, WORLD
BANK (2008), http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAIEXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTWDRS/
EXTWDR2009/0,,contentMDK:21674852menuPK:5593237pagePK:64167689piPK:64167673theSitePK:
4231059,00.html.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See Cho, supra note 28, at 432.
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economies of scale which spokes do not. 12 2
C. RTAs Create Regulatory Failure
RTAs can also create regulatory failure. 12 3 Recently, RTAs have been de-
signed to cover more than just the liberalization of tariffs and quotas.1 24 They
contain chapters involving social regulations such as labor, the environment,
and human health. 125 However, many social charters contained within RTAs are
inconsistent with WTO norms,12 6 thereby undermining efforts to establish a
regulatory norm on a multilateral basis. Some bilateral agreements have diluted
multilateral disciplines on public health because they include provisions on
trade and intellectual property rights.12 7 The US-Jordan RTA includes provi-
sions linking trade and labor.1 2 8 This may be inconsistent with the regulatory
consensus achieved by WTO members through the International Labor Organiza-
tion.129
In addition, the U.S.-Jordan RTA explicitly overrides the WTO's Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) by stating
that any marketing approval of pharmaceutical products should be in confor-
mity with the RTA and not TRIPS. 13 0 This undermines the WTO's multilateral
consensus on the subject. Such inconsistency with WTO policies and rules
impedes global regulatory harmonization for the benefit of companies engaged
in the international market.13 1 For example, the text of NAFTA does not resolve
the issue of the relationship between NAFTA and the WTO.13 2 NAFTA states
that in the event of an inconsistency or conflict with another agreement, NAFTA
prevails unless otherwise provided. 1 3 3 This results in a diversion of resources,
political capital, public attention, and other resources from the multilateral
process.13 4 These resources are already scarce in emerging market countries
which cannot afford their diversion. The more time an emerging market country
spends on RTAs, the less time the country has to employ these resources in
pursuit of multilateralism.
122. Id.
123. See Cho, supra note 21, at 42.
124. See GEP, supra note 42, at 35.
125. See Cho, supra note 21, at 67. For example, the US-Singapore FTA and the Japan-Singapore
Economic Agreement for a New Age Partnership contain environmental provisions. See CB Report,
supra note 23, at 37.
126. Cho, supra note 21, at 42.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 69.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See NAFTA, supra note 10, art. 103(2), 32 I.L.M. at 297.
133. Id.
134. See Cho, supra note 21, at 69.
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Multiple regulations involving the same subject confuse the issues on a
global scale and can increase transaction costs for global businesses.13 5 Produc-
ers in non-member countries have to bear additional compliance costs when it
exports goods to RTA countries with disparate regulations.' 36 In addition, these
trade barriers may entirely block products from non-member countries if the
products do not conform to the RTA's unique rules. 13 7 Firms often produce
goods based on a particular method; manufacturing the product by a different
method that conforms to one particular RTA's regulations could prove costly.
Therefore, multiple regulations only serve to hinder global trade and undermine
multilateral harmonization of regulatory issues.
D. RTAs Divert Trade
Economists generally believe that RTAs are inferior to multilateral agree-
ments when it comes to trade creation. 13 Countries excluded from RTAs almost
always lose because member states have preferred access to the markets of
included countries, thereby reducing the demand for exports of excluded states
into the markets of the RTA. 13 9
According to Professor Harrison of the University of Central Florida, because
of the trade diversion effects on both included and excluded countries, multi-
lateral trade liberalization provides larger gains to the world than an elaborate
network of RTAs. 14 0 The RTAs studied in his article only produced small gains
or losses to the world. 14 1 RTAs are obstacles because they decrease the aggre-
gate global welfare by competing with non-member countries and other RTAs
to increase the tariffs against other blocs to shift the terms of trade in each
bloc's favor.14 2 The global welfare is diminished because RTA member products
are protected, regardless of whether they are of equal quality of non-member
products or even equal efficiency. 143 Protecting infant industries against imports
tends to be indiscriminate and creates incentives for infant producers to remain
inefficient and continue demanding protections which become politically diffi-
cult to remove.'" These infant industries never learn, grow or develop. 145 Some
scholars argue that poor countries and infant industries need a certain measure
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 62.
139. Glenn W. Harrison et al., Rules of Thumb for Evaluating Preferential Trading Arrangements:
Evidence from Computable General Equilibrium Assessments 2 (2003), available at www.wilsoncenter.
org/events/docs/harrisontarr.pdf.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 3.
142. See Cho, supra note 28, at 430.
143. Id.
144. See Bhagwati, supra note 95.
145. Id.
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of protection in order to grow.146 However, India managed to develop industries
such as shipping, steel and textiles without protection. 14 7
Discriminatory trade barriers contained within RTAs may cause sales by
member countries to displace sales from more efficient countries, which deny
producers and consumers access to superior quality and lower cost goods. 148
According to a study on MERCOSUR's trade impact by Alexander Yeats,
principal economist at the World Bank, RTA members often trade goods in
which they have no comparative advantage. 149 This impacts both members and
non-members. The study determined that MERCOSUR is becoming "less ...
internationally competitive in products where trade is reorienting . .. towards
the region."15 0 Yeats suggests that MERCOSUR's own trade barriers are the
problem because certain goods are protected by higher-than-average discrimina-
tory trade barriers, providing local producers an incentive to seek the higher
prices which are available on the sale of the products to MERCOSUR mar-
kets.15 ' By diverting exports from more competitive foreign markets, its compara-
tive advantage decreases in these products, 15 2 and it reduces the ability of
non-member countries to export goods to MERCOSUR members.15 3
In addition, intra-trade liberalization may be limited because certain sectors
may be insulated from open trade by being excluded from coverage under the
RTA or protected by rules of origin.'5 4 RTAs may provide a global loss to wel-
fare by excluding major products from its coverage.' 55 RTAs generally "do not
address the tariff peaks in major products" or provide a comprehensive means
for liberalizing the products.' 5 6 For example, in the European community, trade
creation outweighs trade diversion in the manufactured products; however,
under its common agricultural policy, European farmers are sheltered from
foreign competition.' 5 7 In addition, non-reciprocal preferences15 8 like "the U.S.
[Generalized System of Preferences] and other developing country preferences
exclude commodities linked to U.S. domestic support programs," including
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Caroline Freund & Emanuel Ornelas, Regional Trade Agreements 5 (Pol'y Research, Working
Paper No. 5314, 2010), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1612091##.
149. Alexander J. Yeats, Does Mercosur's Trade Performance Raise Concerns about the Effects of
Regional Trade Arrangements?, 12 WORLD BANK EcON. REv. 1, 16 (1998).
150. See id. at 16.
151. See id. at 16-17.
152. Yeats notes that trade grew most rapidly in sectors where products were being diverted from
export markets to MERCOSUR markets. Id.
153. See id. at 25-26.
154. Cf id. at 26.
155. See Cho, supra note 21, at 62.
156. Id. at 62-63.
157. See id at 63.
158. According to Burfisher et al., "Non-reciprocal preferences are agreements between developed
and developing countries that typically allow for low or duty-free access for developing-country
exports." Burfisher et al., supra note 6, at 16.
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processed foods with sugar and dairy content, such as confectionary items.'
Therefore, a trade preference's benefits might be outweighed by the trade it diverts.
RTAs.also provide an opportunity for local interest groups to manipulate the
design and operation of RTAs, which can distort the efficient flow of interstate
commerce. For example, some RTAs utilize rules of origin matrices which
safeguard "originating goods" from member countries with preferential treat-
ment.' Rules of origin are a reference to domestic regulations that determine
an imported good's country of origin:16 "For example, Mexican apparel can
receive tariff-free treatment within NAFTA only if it is produced with North
American textiles and yam."' 6 2 In addition, CAFTA eliminates tariffs and
quotas on apparel and textiles if the countries meet CAFTA's provisions on the
rules of origin and gives duty-free benefits to some apparel made in Central
America containing certain fabrics from NAFITA partners Canada and Mexico.163
Rules of origin are inherent in RTAs because RTAs by their very nature provide
preferential treatment to goods from a member state. These rules also negatively
affect international commerce by discriminating against non-member states. 164
Therefore, RTAs may be seen as institutionalizing protectionism. 16 5 The ben-
efits created by increasing intra-bloc trade may be outweighed by the bloc in
trade they cause. 16 6 In addition, it can be extremely difficult to determine a
product's country of origin given that several countries may be involved in the
manufacturing process of one good.16 7 These rules can be extremely burden-
some and complicated and therefore impose large transaction costs and burdens
to the businesses and firms manufacturing these goods. 1 6 8 For example, NAFTA
has rules "to ensure that importers, exporters, and manufacturers comply with
the certificate of origin requirements." 16 9 All three parties must maintain records
relating to the good's origin for a period of five years. 17 0 NAFTA parties are
allowed to verify the origin of goods through questionnaires or visits. 17' Firms
face an additional cost to establish procedures to ensure compliance with
NAFTA's certificate of origin and record-keeping requirements. 172 It also re-
quires an expert to be trained or hired to determine compliance with NAFTA's
159. See id.
160. See Cho, supra note 28, at 431.
161. See Cho, supra note 21, at 64.
162. See Nsour, supra note 13, at 366.
163. See Laun, supra note 100, at 435.
164. See Cho, supra note 28, at 431.
165. See Cho, supra note 21, at 42.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 65.
168. Seeid.
169. William W. Kovatch, Jr., The NAFTA's Rules of Origin, Certificate of Origin, and Record-
Keeping Requirements: The Disadvantage to Small Businesses, 12 TRANSNAT'L L. 403, 414 (1999).
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 415.
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rules of origin and various classification rules. 17 3 All of this can be quite costly
and detrimental to some businesses.
CONCLUSIONS
RTAs have become a common feature in the global trade arena. In determin-
ing their utility it is important to employ economic and political theories that
take into account the nuances of the new regionalism. Whereas old regionalism
RTAs were usually single-objective pacts to increase trade or security, new
regionalism results in multi-dimensional comprehensive societal agreements.
These differences must be considered when evaluating their efficacy. The trend
in the last decade has been toward growth and utilization of RTAs, and this
trend is unlikely to reverse itself. In fact, we are likely to see the number of
RTAs increase dramatically as emerging market countries seek more promising
entr6e to the riches of the global market than they have enjoyed under the
WTO/GATT system. Developed and emerging market countries alike have
sought regional trade liberalization. in the face of repeated failures to reach
closure in the Doha Round.
Therefore, it is simply not plausible to evaluate RTAs based solely on their
trade creation and diversion aspects. It is important to take a more holistic view
to determine not only their impact on trade, but also their impact on non-
economic aspects such as human rights compliance1 7 4 and conflict-decreasing
abilities. Beyond the static effects of trade liberalization, new regionalism
creates dynamic effects through trade interconnectedness and investment, such
as transformation of production structures, economies of scale, greater levels of
competition, and changes in company performance that should also be taken
into account. Moreover, regionalism can no longer be seen solely as an eco-
nomic phenomenon; its political dimension must be considered as well. As the
World Bank stresses: "Security, bargaining power, cooperation, and lock-in are
probably the main political motors for regional integration. Sometimes these
motives receive a veneer of economic rationalization." 17 5 This increasingly
complex regionalism is evidenced in Latin America, where trade is intimately
linked to political and geo-political aspects. Latin American regionalism finds
itself in a critical moment where the dynamic coalitions of power and the lack
of social consensus within the different countries have created uncertainty. 1 6
Generally, open trade is considered an instrument that contributes to peace and
security through the creation of economic ties and increased prosperity. Despite
the fact that regional agreements tend to reduce conflict levels by facilitating
173. See id. at 419.
174. See Powell & P6rez, supra note 1.
175. WORLD BANK, TRADE BLOCS 124 (2000).
176. See Philippe De Lombaerde & Luis Jorge Garay, The New Regionalism in Latin America and
the Role of the US 18-19 (UN Univ., Comp. Reg'1 Integration Studies, Occasional Paper No. 0-1006/
10, 2006), available at http://www.cris.unu.edulfileadmin/workingpapers/20060421120114.0-2006-10.
pdf.
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development cooperation, trade also has been utilized to aggravate conflict
levels. This is the case of the relationship between Colombia and both Venezu-
ela and Ecuador. Even though Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador have long
been commercial partners and members of the Andean Community (Colombia
and Ecuador) and the G3 Group (Colombia and Venezuela), trade among these
geographically proximate countries has significantly diminished as a result of
political disagreements. This conflict has created a difficult financial situation
for consumers and the productive sectors of these countries, deepening the
economic crisis in which the world has been immersed for the past three years.
This case shows the profound link between trade and non-economic aspects and
the manner in which trade can work in ways both to mollify conflicts between
trade partners and as a mechanism to exacerbate the conflict through the
cessation or interruption of trade between disputing countries.
However, two questions remain: (1) Does new regionalism support multi-
lateralism or obstruct it? (2) Does new regionalism facilitate development for
emerging market countries or thwart it? Because the WTO regulatory power has
embraced a wide variety of formerly-domestic issues such as consumer protec-
tion and environmental, labor, and food safety standards, many national govern-
ments have perceived the present situation as one of "sovereignty impairment."17 7
This view has contributed to the stalemate in multilateral negotiations.17 8 As a
result, regionalism has become a more viable forum where a reduced number
of countries, perhaps with closer cultural, geographic, and occupational back-
grounds, are more likely to agree on those sensitive issues.17 9 Some may say
that regionalism has been negative in the sense that it has helped developed
countries to spread their policies and strengthen their economic power at the
expense of emerging market countries; however, it is undeniable that regionalism has
been indispensable for emerging market countries to benefit from the opportu-
nity of gaining access to markets that they could not otherwise have entered.
Regionalism has been proposed as an effective answer to the challenges of
global competition both in developed and developing countries, allowing them
to participate in regional and global economies. Countries with better access
to world markets and those more fully integrated into the global economy often
show higher rates of economic growth and have a higher per capita income
as compared to countries with lesser access. New regionalism is outwardly-
oriented and diverse in its geographical coverage, which contributes to more
open and competitive economies because it encourages integral reforms at the
national level and ultimately at the multilateral level. Consequently, if RTAs
attain a broader scale and regionalism continues to support internal reform
processes and brings about greater geographic diversity connecting partners
177. Brigid Gavin, Reconciling Regionalism and Multilateralism Towards Multilevel Governance,
10 (UN Univ., Comp. Reg'] Integration Studies, Occasional Paper No. 0-2005/20, 2005), available at
http://www.cris.unu.edulfileadmin/workingpapers/20051206104911.O-2005-20.pdf.
178. Id.
179. See id.
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from different macro-regions of the world economy, new regionalism might
become the appropriate tool to complement and activate multilateralism. 180
At a multilateral level, Article XXIV of the GATT, Article 5 of the GATS,
and the Enabling Clause provide the policy framework for a regional develop-
ment scheme. These rules are under review in the Doha Round to determine if
they take into consideration the development facet of RTAs. The Doha Round
objective of lowering trade barriers throughout the world to allow countries to
increase trade globally should be accompanied by definition of the fundamental
criterions that would make RTAs development friendly.' 8 ' The WTO provides
for the concession of special rights to emerging market countries. These "spe-
cial and different treatment" (SDT) provisions, which include longer time
periods, special support, and lower levels of commitment to increase the
integration of emerging market countries into international trade flows, allow
emerging markets to be treated more favorably than other members. 18 2 Simi-
larly, "the enabling clause, officially called 'Decision on differential and more
favorable treatment, reciprocity and fuller participation for developing coun-
tries' is the legal basis for the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and
also the legal basis for regional arrangements among" emerging market coun-
tries. Under the Enabling Clause, developed country WTO Members may
give preferential trade concessions to this majority of WTO Members as an
exception to the GATT's Most-favored Nation Clause.184 Thus, the mutual
relation between regionalism and multilateralism should be seen as a matter of
mutual consistency and complementarity.18 5 As expressed in 2007 by the WTO
Director General, Pascal Lamy, the future of the world trade order lies in "'a
strong and modern multilateral trading system coupled with RTAs which am-
plify rather than undermine its benefits. A strong multilateral trading system
complemented-not substituted-by a new generation of regional trade agree-
ments,' which are thus like 'pepper in the multilateral curry."' 186
Lamy's apparent comfort with the growth of RTAs reflects, in our view, not
so much lack of concern with their adverse effects on multilateralism as
recognition of the course of economic integration chosen by his employers, the
WTO Members. In order to reconcile WTO regulation and regional agreements,
the Doha Round must be able to define the principles that would allow
emerging market countries to exploit RTAs and to design a development
180. See Pavel Hnit, Multilateralism and New Regionalism: Impacts on Global Economic Gover-
nance, UNIVERSrrY OF EcONOMICS, 9-10 (2010), http://www.ceeisaconf.uni.wroc.pl/wordy/papers%
201%20session/hnatl.pdf.
181. See id. at 5-6.
182. Bob Deacon et al., Regional Integration, Decent Work, and Labour and Social Policies in West
and Southern Africa 14 (UN Univ., Comp. Reg'1 Integration Studies, Working Paper No. W-2008/13),
available at http://www.cris.unu.edu/fileadmin/workingpapers/W-2008-13.pdf.
183. Id.
184. See id.
185. See Hndt, supra note 180, at 5.
186. Id. at 11.
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strategy for their benefit while advancing multilateralism. Emerging market
countries need to work toward a development strategy at different levels.'8 7
This strategy presupposes the existence, at a multilateral level, of market access
provisions that promote global trade, as well as regional integration that would
also increase trade not only between rich and poor WTO Members but, most
importantly, among the emerging market countries themselves.
Trade among emerging market countries has almost doubled over the past
twenty years, and has expanded from trade mostly in commodities and agricul-
tural products, to include trade in services.' 8 8 As intra-regional and interregional
trade grows, there will be a need for regional regulation that should be in
accordance with clear multilateral rules of economic liberalization. These regula-
tions would apply even where various levels of economic liberalization overlap,
thereby solving the Spaghetti Bowl crisis.
We noted earlier that RTAs may not necessarily complement the global
regional trading system.' 8 9 With successful conclusion of the Doha Round
stalled for many years and RTAs proliferating as fast as new leaves in the
spring, some trade experts already bemoan the demise of the WTO.190 At least
half of world trade crosses borders without reference to MFN principles, the
most basic of foundational GATT principles. Is modem trade multilateralism at
an end a mere sixty years after its birth?
Perhaps we underestimate the WTO's staying power. With the explosion of
RTAs comes the exponential growth in the spaghetti bowl of inconsistent and
sometimes inexplicable trade rules. These rules confound those who export to
more than one region and have eaten away at the basic premise of the multi-
lateral trading system. In the near future, can we expect these participants in the
global market to demand some mechanism that, at minimum, compiles these
multifarious regulations into an easily searched location and, at best, harmo-
nizes them to some standardized, business-friendly system? What other intema-
tional -organization is better equipped than the WTO to use its vaunted data-
gathering skills to create the perfect web site to track, categorize, and explain
each of the thousands of RTA rules? Every WTO Member is already a party to
at least one and usually several RTAs. Therefore, the WTO is in perfect position
to engage its Members in the task of recommending harmonious "regional"
trading rules that will return some semblance of predictability and order to the
global market. WTO Members, acting in their own interests, cannot possibly
resist adapting their RTAs to these user-friendly standards. It may well be that
RTAs, operating under the WTO umbrella, will become the new glue of multilateral-
ism.
187. See Gavin, supra note 177, at 12.
188. Id.
189. See supra text accompanying note 88.
190. These final paragraphs are based on a post at Professor Powell's blog. See Stephen J. Powell,
Regional Trade Agreements as the New Glue in Multilateralism?, JUST TRADE (Oct. 25, 2010, 3:43 PM),
http://powell-on-just-trade.blogspot.com/2010/10/regional-trade-agreements-as-new-glue.html.
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